Dworkin

A common criticism of utilitarianism is that it can allow for the preferences of a majority to be satisfied at the expense of a minority.

A common response is that a rights based normative theoryprotects all people against the sacrifice of some people for the gain of others (the extent and content of this protection is determined by the list of rights protected).

Utilitarian theory andtheories which include rights are often seen as incompatible. (because rights interfere with calculations of utility and vice versa)

Dworkin attempts to combine a utilitarian theory with a theory ofrights. He thus attempts to show how the advantages of each theory can coexist in a single political theory. He argues that the protection of political independence, through rights, is (a) consistentwith utilitarianism and (b) can be argued from the same basic premises. Therefore the rights which he argues for can be compatible with utilitarianism

Dworkin's detailed exploration of the problemof preference aggregation in utilitarianism:

Utilitarianism as a political theory is about aggregating preferences

But there is a problem here which complicates the calculation of aggregateutility: People can have other-regarding preferences (other regarding = a preference about what happens to someone else)
e.g (1) Sarah lovers - want more for Sarah (It is important to note here that forthose resources or privileges which are finite this means less for people who are not Sarah)
e.g (2) Nazis who have a preferences which would mean worse conditions for Jews because they are JewsAccording to a simple utility calculation these questionable other-regarding preferences would be counted as valid. They would be just as valid as the preferences of someone who said that what theyneed to be happy are relatively self regarding things: say carrots, blue shirts and tricycles

This could lead to relative promotion of some people's preferences and the abuse of other people....