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The threat of a Greek exit
Unhappy in their own ways
www. economist.com
The escalating Greek crisis leaves Ireland and Portugal, in particular, ever more vulnerable
May 12th 2012 | from the print edition
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Mean streets getting meaner
THE deep uncertainty over what will happen next in Greece unnerved financial markets. On May 7th the euro touched its lowestvalue against the dollar since January while in Athens the stockmarket fell by 7% and bank stocks by 13%. Greek bonds also took a hit, with the yield on the ten-year bond rising to 22.9% (from 20.5% at the end of April). Investors piled into the havens of German government bonds and American Treasuries. The Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 fell to its lowest level so far in 2012.
On the same day AngelaMerkel, the German chancellor, was swift to insist that there could be no backtracking on the commitments Greece made at the time of its second bail-out earlier this year. By the end of June a Greek government is supposed to specify a further package of reforms and spending cuts, worth 5.5% of GDP; these are to be carried out in two instalments, the first in 2013, the second in 2014. But thattimetable now looks more or less impossible, even if a government can be found that wants to stick to the bail-out’s conditions. Relations between the country and its creditors may sour to such a point that a Greek exit from the euro—a “grexit”, as it is coming to be known—becomes inevitable. This need not be a self-fulfilling prophecy. But the more real it comes to seem, the more corrosive its effects onconfidence, which adds further to the risks.
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Even before an exit Greece’s banks could collapse if the steady withdrawal of deposits—they are 30% below their peak,according to Credit Suisse—were to develop into an outright run. After an exit debts to foreign creditors would soar as the new drachma fell, leading to further defaults. On strict legal grounds, Greece could find itself cast out of the European Union as well as the euro area, at risk of losing access to the single market.
But the panic would not be confined to Greece (which made up just 2.3% ofthe euro zone by GDP in 2011). Depositors in other vulnerable economies could take fright and try to withdraw their funds from their banking systems. Even if the European Central Bank (ECB) fought this with massive liquidity support, the crisis would shake already frail banks, especially in Spain (see article).
A departure might not be quite as catastrophic for banks elsewhere in Europe as onceit would have been. The bail-out deal agreed in February meant that private holders of Greek government bonds “voluntarily” had to exchange their holdings of bonds for new ones worth a fraction of the old. Seeing this coming, many banks had already written down the debt. That explains much of the €8 billion ($10 billion) in Greece-related losses that hit French banks last year, according toanalysts at Credit Suisse.
Banks have more or less called a halt to new lending to Greek institutions, companies and banks. By the end of 2011 foreign banks’ exposure to the Greek public sector had fallen to about $23 billion from $64 billion in September 2010. Cross-border loans to Greek firms and households had also fallen, from $86 billion to $69 billion. But that is still a lot.

Banks have foundit difficult to cut lending any faster, partly because some loans are not due to mature for years, so they have sought other ways of reducing the potential losses that would follow if Greece adopts a new currency. One strategy is to gather Greek deposits to match the value of loans outstanding. Their thinking is that if the money they are owed is worth less, then so too should be the money they...