Institutional analysis of antitrust law

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An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy

International Competition Law Series VOLUME 38 Editor-in-Chief Alastair Sutton, Visting Fellow at the Centre of European Law at King’s College, London

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy
The Latin American Experience

By Ignacio De Leon ´

Law &Business

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements Preface Introduction Latin American Antitrust Policy: A Concealed Utopia? Part I The Wellsprings of Latin American Competition Policy Chapter 1 Government Intervention as the Source of Monopoly in Latin America 1.1 Social Utopia and Government Dirigisme: An Old Latin American Blend 1.1.1 The Utopian Quest of the Fair Price 1.1.2 Spain’s ColonialMercantilism 1.1.3 Government Dirigisme and National Identity 1.1.4 The Mirage of Economic Autarchy Rent Seeking and Anticompetitive Restraints in Latin America 1.2.1 Government Dirigisme as the Source of Anticompetitive Restraints 1.2.2 Rent Seeking in Latin America

xv xvii xix 1

3 7 7 10 18 20 33 34 36


vi Chapter 2 The Adoption of Antitrust Policy in Latin America 2.1

Table ofContents 41 41 42 43 45 47 51 53 56 58 59 62 64 65 67 67 70 71 73 78 79 80 82 83 83 87 88 90 91 93 94 96 99 102 104 107




Antitrust Policy as a Component of Latin America’s Neoliberal Reforms 2.1.1 Neoliberal Reforms: A Real Change of Spirit? 2.1.2 The Effects of Neoliberal Reforms on Market Competition 2.1.3 The Second ‘‘Institutional’’ Generation of Reforms 2.1.4Constitutional Foundation of Latin American Antitrust Policy 2.1.5 Exemptions to Antitrust Rules Government Immunity and Strategic Industries State-Owned Enterprises Strategic Industries Politically Influential Groups Intellectual Property and Antitrust Policy Rationale behind the Antitrust Exemptions 2.1.6 The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Antitrust Rules 2.1.7Subjective Jurisdiction: Enterprises Competition Agencies: Coercive Powers 2.2.1 Capacity to Make Investigations and Inquiries 2.2.2 The Popularity of Leniency Programs 2.2.3 The Collection of Confidential Information 2.2.4 Punitive Remedies 2.2.5 Civil Remedies 2.2.6 Criminal Provisions 2.2.7 Preventive Measures and Compliance Orders 2.2.8 Capacity to Negotiate Anticipated Settlements TheInternational Dimension of Latin American Antitrust Policy 2.3.1 South American Regional Antitrust Rules: Andean Community and Mercosur 2.3.2 Failed Multilateral Antitrust: The FTAA and WTO 2.3.3 The Advisory Role of UNCTAD and the OECD 2.3.4 The International Competition Network The Emergence of Antitrust Policy as By-Product of Latin American Antimarket Traditions

Chapter 3 Antitrust Economics: A...