Is Democracy Good For The Poor?

Is Democracy Good for the Poor?
Michael Ross

University of California, Los Angeles

Many scholars claim that democracy improves the welfare of the poor. This article uses data on infant and child mortality
to challenge this claim. Cross-national studies tend to exclude from their samples nondemocratic states that have performed
well; this leads to the mistaken inference thatnondemocracies have worse records than democracies. Once these and other
flaws are corrected, democracy has little or no effect on infant and child mortality rates. Democracies spend more money on
education and health than nondemocracies, but these benefits seem to accrue to middle- and upper-income groups.

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any studies claim to show that democracies
do a better job than nondemocracies of improving thewelfare of the poor (Boone 1996;
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Dasgupta 1993; Franco,
Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004; Lake and Baum 2001;
McGuire 2001; Moon and Dixon 1985; Przeworski et al.
2000; Sen 1981, 1999; Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin
2004; Zweifel and Navia 2000). These claims are consistent with leading political economy models, which suggest
that democracies produce more publicgoods, and more
income redistribution, than nondemocracies (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003; Ghorbarah, Huth, and Russett 2004; McGuire and
Olson 1996; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Niskanen 1997).
There is good evidence that democracies fund public
services at a higher level than nondemocracies (Avelino,
Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 2004;Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2005; Kaufman and SeguraUbiergo 2001; McGuire 2006; Stasavage 2005a; Tavares
and Wacziarg 2001). But it is not obvious that these infusions of money actually reach the poor; nor is it obvious
that they produce better social outcomes, such as longer,
healthier, or more productive lives. If democracy produces
better outcomes for low-income families, then countries
thattransit from autocratic to democratic rule should see
improvements in their infant and child mortality rates. In
general, they do not. Figure 1 displays changes in the log

of infant mortality rates of all 44 states that made a single,
unambiguous transition to democracy between 1970 and
1999.1 While the infant mortality rates of these states collectively fell by 7.4% during the first fiveyears after their
transitions, they fell by 10.7% during the five years before
their transitions.2
Perhaps this helps explain why people in newly democratized countries often vote for candidates and parties
associated with former dictators. A recent United Nations
survey found that 54.7% of respondents in Latin America
would prefer a dictatorship to a democracy, if it would
help “resolve”their economic problems (UNDP 2004).
This article suggests that past studies of democracy
and the poor have been flawed by a surprising form
of selection bias: most cross-national studies omit from
their samples nondemocratic states with good economic
and social records, which creates the false impression
that democracies have outperformed nondemocracies.
Most also fail to control forcountry-specific fixed effects and global health trends. Once these flaws are corrected, democracy has little or no effect on infant and
child mortality.
If democracies spend more money on public services
than nondemocracies, why do they fail to achieve better results? Perhaps democracies subsidize the budgets of
middle- and upper-income groups who can afford to buy
food and health servicesprivately, but not the poor, who

Michael Ross is associate professor of political science, University of California, Los Angeles, Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095 (mlross@
polisci.ucla.edu).
Thanks to John Gerring, Marty Gilens, James Honaker, Phil Keefer, Marisa Kellam, Jeff Lewis, Kevin Morrison, Irfan Nooruddin, Aakanksha
Pande, Dan Posner, Lant Pritchett, Duncan Thomas, Peter Timmer, Dan...