Acemoglu economig origins of dictatorship and democracy

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Daron Acemoglu James A. Robinson
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Daron Acemoglu: To the memory of my parents, Kevork and Irma, who have invested so much in me. To my love, Asu, who has been my inspiration and companion throughout. James A. Robinson: To the memory of my mother, from whom I inherited mypassion for books and my indignation at the injustices of this life. To the memory of my father, from whom I inherited my fascination for science and my curiosity about this extraordinary world.

Contents
Part 1. Questions and Answers 1 1 2 4 7 10 13 15 16 18 21 23 29 30 40 41 43 45 45 47 49 52 53 60 65 73 75 75 76 78 84 97 100 101 101
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Chapter 1. Paths of Political Development 1. Britain 2.Argentina 3. Singapore 4. South Africa 5. The Agenda Chapter 2. Our Argument 1. Democracy vs. Nondemocracy 2. Building Blocks of Our Approach 3. Towards Our Basic Story 4. Our Theory of Democratization 5. Democratic Consolidation 6. Determinants of Democracy 7. Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict 8. Democracy in a Picture 9. Overview of the Book Chapter 3. What Do We Know AboutDemocracy? 1. Measuring Democracy 2. Patterns of Democracy 3. Democracy, Inequality and Redistribution 4. Crises and Democracy 5. Social Unrest and Democratization 6. The Literature 7. Our Contribution Part 2. Modelling Politics

Chapter 4. Democratic Politics 1. Introduction 2. Aggregating Individual Preferences 3. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem 4. Our Workhorse Models 5.Democracy and Political Equality 6. Conclusion Chapter 5. Nondemocratic Politics 1. Introduction

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CONTENTS

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies Commitment Problems A Simple Game of Promises A Dynamic Model Incentive Compatible Promises Conclusion The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy

102 110114 125 130 140 148 149 151 151 151 153 154 158 162 168 175 177 180 180 184 186 187 188 191 191 193 195 199 212 213 214 216 216 218 221 223 223 226 229 233 238 242 246

Part 3.

Chapter 6. Democratization 1. Introduction 2. The Role of Political Institutions 3. Preferences over Political Institutions 4. Political Power and Institutions 5. A ‘Static’ Model of Democratization 6. Democratizationor Repression? 7. A Dynamic Model of Democratization 8. Subgame Perfect Equilibria 9. Alternative Political Identities 10. Targeted Transfers 11. Power of the Elite in Democracy 12. Ideological Preferences over Regimes 13. Democratization in Pictures 14. Equilibrium Revolutions 15. Conclusion Chapter 7. Coups and Consolidation 1. Introduction 2. Incentives for Coups 3. A Static Model of Coups 4. ADynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy 5. Alternative Political Identities 6. Targeted Transfers 7. Power in Democracy and Coups 8. Consolidation in a Picture 9. Defensive Coups 10. Conclusion Part 4. Putting the Models to Work

Chapter 8. The Role of the Middle Class 1. Introduction 2. The Three-Class Model 3. Emergence of Partial Democracy 4. From Partial to FullDemocracy 5. Repression: The Middle Class As A Buffer 6. Repression: Soft-liners vs. Hard-liners 7. The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy

CONTENTS

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8. Conclusion Chapter 9. Economic Structure and Democracy 1. Introduction 2. Economic Structure and Income Distribution 3. Political Conflict 4. Capital, Land and the Transition to Democracy 5. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land 6.Capital, Land and the Burden of Democracy 7. Conflict Between Landowners and Industrialists 8. Industrialists, Landowners and Democracy in Practice 9. Economic Institutions 10. Human Capital 11. Conjectures about Political Development 12. Conclusions Chapter 10. Globalization and Democracy 1. Introduction 2. A Model of an Open Economy 3. Political Conflict–Democratic Consolidation 4. Political...