Aquino - On Being And Essence
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Publicado: 2 de marzo de 2013
ON BEING AND ESSENCE
1
On Being and Essence
(DE ENTE Et ESSENTIA)
By Saint Thomas Aquinas
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
ON BEING AND ESSENCE
2
DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA [[1]]
Translation © 1997 by Robert T. Miller[[2]]
Prologue
A small error at the outset can lead to great errors in the final conclusions, as the
Philosophersays in I De Caelo et Mundo cap. 5 (271b8-13), and thus, since being and
essence are the things first conceived of by the intellect, as Avicenna says in
Metaphysicae I, cap. 6, in order to avoid errors arising from ignorance about these two
things, we should resolve the difficulties surrounding them by explaining what the terms
being and essence each signify and by showing how each may befound in various things
and how each is related to the logical intentions of genus, species, and difference.
Since we ought to acquire knowledge of simple things from composite ones and come to
know the prior from the posterior, in instructing beginners we should begin with what is
easier, and so we shall begin with the signification of being and proceed from there to the
signification ofessence.
Chapter 1
As the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 7 (1017a22-35), being has two senses. In
one sense, being signifies that which is divided into the ten categories; in another sense,
that which signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between these is that, in the
second sense, anything can be called a being about which an affirmative proposition can
be formed, even ifthe thing posits nothing in reality. In this way, privations and
negations are called beings, as when we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, or
that blindness is in the eye. But in the first sense, nothing can be called a being unless it
posits something in reality, and thus in this first sense blindness and similar things are not
beings.
The term essence is not taken from being inthe second sense, for in this sense some
things are called beings that have no essence, as is clear with privations. Rather, the term
essence is taken from being in the first sense. Thus in Metaphysicae V, com. 14, the
Commentator explains the cited text from Aristotle by saying that being, in the first
sense, is what signifies the essence of a thing. And since, as said above, being in thissense is divided into the ten categories, essence signifies something common to all
natures through which the various beings are placed in the various genera and species, as
humanity is the essence of man, and so on.
Since that through which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is
signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers introduced the termquiddity to mean the same as the term essence; and this is the same thing that the
Philosopher frequently terms what it is to be a thing, that is, that through which
something has being as a particular kind of thing. Essence is also called form, for the
certitude of every thing is signified through its form, as Avicenna says in his
Metaphysicae I, cap. 6. The same thing is also callednature, taking nature in the first of
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
ON BEING AND ESSENCE
3
the four senses that Boethius distinguishes in his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis
cap. 1 (PL 64, 1341B), in the sense, in other words, that nature is what we call everything
that can in any way be captured by the intellect, for a thing is not intelligible except
through its definitionand essence. And so the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 4
(1014b36) that every substance is a nature. But the term nature used in this way seems to
signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no
thing is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that
this is what is signified by the definition. But the...
1
On Being and Essence
(DE ENTE Et ESSENTIA)
By Saint Thomas Aquinas
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
ON BEING AND ESSENCE
2
DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA [[1]]
Translation © 1997 by Robert T. Miller[[2]]
Prologue
A small error at the outset can lead to great errors in the final conclusions, as the
Philosophersays in I De Caelo et Mundo cap. 5 (271b8-13), and thus, since being and
essence are the things first conceived of by the intellect, as Avicenna says in
Metaphysicae I, cap. 6, in order to avoid errors arising from ignorance about these two
things, we should resolve the difficulties surrounding them by explaining what the terms
being and essence each signify and by showing how each may befound in various things
and how each is related to the logical intentions of genus, species, and difference.
Since we ought to acquire knowledge of simple things from composite ones and come to
know the prior from the posterior, in instructing beginners we should begin with what is
easier, and so we shall begin with the signification of being and proceed from there to the
signification ofessence.
Chapter 1
As the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 7 (1017a22-35), being has two senses. In
one sense, being signifies that which is divided into the ten categories; in another sense,
that which signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between these is that, in the
second sense, anything can be called a being about which an affirmative proposition can
be formed, even ifthe thing posits nothing in reality. In this way, privations and
negations are called beings, as when we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, or
that blindness is in the eye. But in the first sense, nothing can be called a being unless it
posits something in reality, and thus in this first sense blindness and similar things are not
beings.
The term essence is not taken from being inthe second sense, for in this sense some
things are called beings that have no essence, as is clear with privations. Rather, the term
essence is taken from being in the first sense. Thus in Metaphysicae V, com. 14, the
Commentator explains the cited text from Aristotle by saying that being, in the first
sense, is what signifies the essence of a thing. And since, as said above, being in thissense is divided into the ten categories, essence signifies something common to all
natures through which the various beings are placed in the various genera and species, as
humanity is the essence of man, and so on.
Since that through which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is
signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers introduced the termquiddity to mean the same as the term essence; and this is the same thing that the
Philosopher frequently terms what it is to be a thing, that is, that through which
something has being as a particular kind of thing. Essence is also called form, for the
certitude of every thing is signified through its form, as Avicenna says in his
Metaphysicae I, cap. 6. The same thing is also callednature, taking nature in the first of
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
ON BEING AND ESSENCE
3
the four senses that Boethius distinguishes in his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis
cap. 1 (PL 64, 1341B), in the sense, in other words, that nature is what we call everything
that can in any way be captured by the intellect, for a thing is not intelligible except
through its definitionand essence. And so the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 4
(1014b36) that every substance is a nature. But the term nature used in this way seems to
signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no
thing is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that
this is what is signified by the definition. But the...
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