Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study

Bridge Watchkeeping Safety S tudy

Marine Accident Investigation Branch First Floor Carlton House Carlton Place Southampton United Kingdom SO15 2DZ Safety Study 1/2004 July 2004

Extract from The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 1999

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is to determine its circumstances and thecause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame Note This report is not written with liability in mind and is not intended to be used in court for the purpose of litigation. It endeavours to identify andanalyse the relevant safety issues pertaining to the specific accident, and to make recommendations aimed at preventing similar accidents in the future.

CONTENTS
Page GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BACKGROUND METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW ANALYSIS Groundings Manning levels and fatigue Collisions Lookout Use of radar The use of sound signals and VHF Safe manning The role of the masterThe principles of safe manning CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS Annex A Annex B Questionnaire Annexes to IMO Resolution A.890 (21) Principles of safe manning 1 2 3 4 8 8 10 15 17 21 22 23 24 25 27 28

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AIS ARPA COLREGS gt IMO ISPS ITF MAIB MCA OMBO OOW SOLAS STCW UK UMS VHF Automatic Identification System Automatic Radar Plotting Aid International Regulations forPreventing Collisions at Sea Gross registered tons (measurement of volume) International Maritime Organization International Ship and Port Facility Security Code International Transport Federation Marine Accident Investigation Branch Maritime and Coastguard Agency One Man Bridge Operation Officer of the Watch Safety of Life at Sea Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping UnitedKingdom Unmanned Machinery Space Very High Frequency (radio)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At 0515, on 29 June 2003, the general dry cargo vessel Jambo ran aground, and subsequently sank, at the entrance to Loch Broom on the west coast of Scotland. The vessel was carrying 3,300 tonnes of zinc concentrate, prompting fears of an environmental disaster (Report 27/2003). This was the latest in a series ofremarkably similar accidents, the common features of which included fatigued officers, one man bridge operation at night, missed course alterations and no watch alarms. This study was commissioned to establish the principal factors that cause nautical accidents, and to consider whether fatigue is as prevalent and dangerous as indicated by the Jambo and similar accidents. The study has reviewed in detailthe evidence of 66 collisions, near collisions, groundings and contacts that were investigated by the Branch. It has confirmed that minimal manning, consisting of a master and a chief officer as the only two watchkeeping officers on vessels operating around the UK coastline, leads to watchkeeper fatigue and the inability of the master to fulfil his duties, which, in turn, frequently lead toaccidents. It has also found that standards of lookout in general are poor, and late detection or failure to detect small vessels is a factor in many collisions. The study concludes that the current provisions of STCW 95 in respect of safe manning, hours of work and lookout are not effective. Recommendations have been directed at the MCA to take the conclusions of the study forward to the IMO with theaim of reviewing: 1. The guidelines on safe manning, to ensure that all merchant vessels over 500gt have a minimum of a master plus two bridge watchkeeping officers, unless specifically exempted for limited local operations as approved by the Administration. 2. The requirements of STCW 95 to change the emphasis with respect to the provision of a designated lookout to ensure that a lookout is...