finanzas

COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING IN A MARKETING CHANNEL
This article examines dynamic advertising and promotion strategies in a marketing channel where the retailer promotes the manufacturer product and the manufacturer spends on advertising to build a stock of goodwill. We assume that sales depend on goodwill and promotion activities and that there are decreasing marginal returns to goodwill. Twoscenarios are studied. First, the manufacturer and retailer determine noncooperatively their respective strategies. Second, the game is played a` la Stackelberg with the manufacturer as the leader who supports partially the cost of the promotion activities of the retailer. In both cases, stationary Markovian strategies are characterized. These scenarios are examined also in the absence of decreasingmarginal effect of goodwill on sales. The results show that, whether or not the goodwill stock has a decreasing marginal effect on sales, the cooperative advertising program is a coordinating mechanism in the marketing channel, i.e., both players receive higher payoffs.
This paper studies advertising strategies in a marketing channel, formed of one manufacturer and one retailer, in a dynamicsetting. The framework is that of differential games and the focus is on the so-called cooperative advertising. This is an arrangement where a manufacturer pays some or all of the cost of the local advertising undertaken by a retailer for the manufacturer products.
The cooperative advertising program can take three forms: a full support program where the manufacturer contributes to both types ofretailer advertising expenditures, and two partial support programs where the manufacturer supports only one of the two types of retailer advertising. Stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibria are characterized and strategies and payoffs are compared for different scenarios.
We consider a channel of distribution formed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer controls his promotionalspending, and the manufacturer controls his advertising spending and rate of support to the retailer promotional expenses. Both players seek to maximize a stream of discounted profits over an infinite horizon. The sales are assumed to depend on the retailer promotion of the product and on the level of goodwill.
Suppose that the retailer carries only the manufacturer brand within the product class (thissetting seems to correspond to a number of industries, e.g., cars, gasoline, etc.). We wish to focus on advertising and assume, for simplicity, that the manufacturer profit margin πM and retailer profit margin π R are constant. The manufacturer M controls his advertising efforts in national media A(t). The retailer R controls his local advertising (promotion) effort p(t). The manufactureradvertising contributes to the accumulation of consumer goodwill G(t), which evolves according to the Nerlove and Arrow model (Ref. 6); that is,

G˙(t) = GαA(t) - δG(t), G(0) = G0 ≥ 0,
Where α>0 reflects the efficiency of the manufacturer advertising and δ>0 is the constant decay rate of the goodwill stock.
With the Nash Equilibrium without Promotional Support., we assume that each channel memberdetermines independently his advertising strategy and that the manufacturer does not support the retailer promotional effort. Since the game is played over an infinite-time horizon, it is reasonable to seek a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium. In this case, the players decisions are functions of the state of the system, that is, the goodwill level.
So with these information we made the resumeof this article that really explains the context that we have seen trough the semester, related to the context of sells.











PUBLICIDAD COOPERATIVA EN UN CANAL DE MARKETING


Este artículo examina la publicidad dinámica y las estrategias de promoción en un canal de comercialización en donde la tienda promueve la manufacturación del producto y el fabricante gasta en...