Ing biomecanica

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ready to pay for an extra unit ceases to cover the cost of the latter (Dupuit's condition). It alsoimplies that each beneficiary must not contribute to the payment more than the monetary equivalent of its value to him, whereas their total contribution must not fall short of total cost. This is “benefit taxation”, but for implementation this tax can either be levied specifically in relation to this advantage (and eventually be ear-marked for the provision of this good), or be aggregated toother notional taxes paid by the person for other specific reasons, i.e. into a more general tax scheme. Furthermore, this principle is not sufficient since it only gives an upper limit for each of the taxes and a lower limit for their sum - and it does not say how the 'surplus' due to the provision of this public good is allocated. The implicit agreement principle however implies that the surplus isallocated between the putatively contracting parties, the beneficiaries and the producer(s) of the good (for its primary allocation, since general economic interdependence induces further effects). Not infrequently the sole information that taxes must not exceed willingnesses to pay and must not in total amount to less than cost defines them relatively precisely, in particular when beneficiarieshave alternatives to the consumption of this public good. For the general case, the levels of these taxes, or the distribution of the surplus, are determined thanks to the bargaining theory which is relevant to the situation. This theory relies on the fact that the pre-agreement allocation and distribution is a legitimate starting point from the very definition of the general ethical theory. Itdeduces, ingeneral, that the surplus must be allocated in relation to the agents' legitimate bargaining power. The latter is itself determined by the fact that the solution must not be such that a group of persons can prefer to leave the general agreement and eventually build and finance a public good for themselves- The members of this group are influenced by the choices of the others (in oppositionto the usual assumption in the concept of the 'core'), and in particular by what the others decide to produce of the public good if these 'dissidents' can still benefit from it. The result thus depends very much on this structure and on the possibility of 'exclusion' from the benefits of the good, bit the general ethical theory leads to the adoption-of a solution which assumes the possibility ofexclusion (i.e., which disregards its difficulties) as a principle of what the taxes and the surplus allocation must be.
The practical application of the theory to determine the right amounts of public goods and the corresponding taxes requires the estimation of agents' willingness to pay and potential bargaining power. A whole array of various methods is available. and more or less used, togather information about these variables (Kolm, 1972-74, 1973a, 1974b). For the monetary values, knowledge of technology and production functions provide the answer when agents are firms or when the public good benefits consumers through the technical production of some more final good. These values can also be inferred from the observation of market values of consumptions which are substitute orcomplementary to the public good (for example private material protection for public police protection, land values or rents for environmental quality differences, wage as value of time to estimate the worth of improved transportation infrastructure, etc.). Furthermore, in a poll asking people about the value of the public good to them (or of a variation of its quantity), they have no incentive to...