No Lo Se
Páginas: 5 (1065 palabras)
Publicado: 9 de diciembre de 2012
Noam Chomsky A Just War? Hardly
Khaleej Times, May 9, 2006 Spurred 1 by these times of invasions and evasions, discussion of “just war” has had a renaissance among scholars and even among policy-makers. Concepts aside, actions in the real world all too often reinforce the maxim of Thucydides that “The strong do as they can, while the weak suffer what they must”—which is not only indisputablyunjust, but at the present stage of human civilization, a literal threat 2 to the survival of the species. In his highly praised 3 reflections on just war, Michael Walzer describes the invasion of Afghanistan as “a triumph of just war theory,” standing alongside Kosovo as a “just war.” Unfortunately, in these two cases, as throughout, his
1
arguments rely 4 crucially on premises like “seems to meentirely justified,” or “I believe” or “no doubt.” Facts are ignored, even the most obvious ones. Consider Afghanistan. As the bombing began in October 2001, President Bush warned 5 Afghans that it would continue until they handed over 6 people that the US suspected of terrorism. The word “suspected” is important. Eight months later, FBI head Robert S. Mueller III told editors at The WashingtonPost that after what must have been the most intense manhunt 7 in history, “We think the masterminds 8 of (the Sept. 11 attacks) were in Afghanistan, high in the alQaida leadership. Plotters 9 and others—the principals— came together in Germany and perhaps elsewhere.” What was still unclear in June 2002 could not have been known definitively the preceding October, though few doubted at once that itwas true. Nor did I, for what it’s worth, but surmise 10 and evidence are two different things.
4 5
animado, incitado. amenaza. 3 muy elogiado.
2
depender de. advirtió, avisó. 6 entregar. 7 persecución; cacería humana; búsqueda. 8 cerebros. 9 conspiradores. 10 conjetura, suposición.
A Just War? Hardly
44
At least it seems fair to say that the circumstances raise a question aboutwhether bombing Afghans was a transparent example of “just war.” Walzer’s arguments are directed to unnamed targets— for example, campus opponents who are “pacifists.” He adds that their “pacifism” is a “bad argument,” because he thinks violence is sometimes legitimate. We may well agree that violence is sometimes legitimate (I do), but “I think” is hardly an overwhelming argument in thereal-world cases that he discusses. By “just war,” counterterrorism or some other rationale, 12 the US exempts 13 itself from the fundamental principles of world order that it played the primary role in formulating and enacting. After World War II, a new regime of international law was instituted. Its provisions on laws of war are codified in the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and the Nurembergprinciples, adopted by the General Assembly. The Charter bars
11
authorized by the Security Council or, under Article 51, in self-defense against armed attack until the Security Council acts. In 2004, a high level UN panel, including, among others, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, concluded that “Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope 15 . .. In a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of nonintervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.” The National Security Strategy of September 2002, just largely reiterated inMarch, grants 16 the US the right to carry out 17 what it calls “pre-emptive war,” which means not preemptive, but “preventive war.” That’s the right to commit aggression, plain and simple. In the wording of the Nuremberg Tribunal, aggression is “the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
11
14
the threat or use of...
Khaleej Times, May 9, 2006 Spurred 1 by these times of invasions and evasions, discussion of “just war” has had a renaissance among scholars and even among policy-makers. Concepts aside, actions in the real world all too often reinforce the maxim of Thucydides that “The strong do as they can, while the weak suffer what they must”—which is not only indisputablyunjust, but at the present stage of human civilization, a literal threat 2 to the survival of the species. In his highly praised 3 reflections on just war, Michael Walzer describes the invasion of Afghanistan as “a triumph of just war theory,” standing alongside Kosovo as a “just war.” Unfortunately, in these two cases, as throughout, his
1
arguments rely 4 crucially on premises like “seems to meentirely justified,” or “I believe” or “no doubt.” Facts are ignored, even the most obvious ones. Consider Afghanistan. As the bombing began in October 2001, President Bush warned 5 Afghans that it would continue until they handed over 6 people that the US suspected of terrorism. The word “suspected” is important. Eight months later, FBI head Robert S. Mueller III told editors at The WashingtonPost that after what must have been the most intense manhunt 7 in history, “We think the masterminds 8 of (the Sept. 11 attacks) were in Afghanistan, high in the alQaida leadership. Plotters 9 and others—the principals— came together in Germany and perhaps elsewhere.” What was still unclear in June 2002 could not have been known definitively the preceding October, though few doubted at once that itwas true. Nor did I, for what it’s worth, but surmise 10 and evidence are two different things.
4 5
animado, incitado. amenaza. 3 muy elogiado.
2
depender de. advirtió, avisó. 6 entregar. 7 persecución; cacería humana; búsqueda. 8 cerebros. 9 conspiradores. 10 conjetura, suposición.
A Just War? Hardly
44
At least it seems fair to say that the circumstances raise a question aboutwhether bombing Afghans was a transparent example of “just war.” Walzer’s arguments are directed to unnamed targets— for example, campus opponents who are “pacifists.” He adds that their “pacifism” is a “bad argument,” because he thinks violence is sometimes legitimate. We may well agree that violence is sometimes legitimate (I do), but “I think” is hardly an overwhelming argument in thereal-world cases that he discusses. By “just war,” counterterrorism or some other rationale, 12 the US exempts 13 itself from the fundamental principles of world order that it played the primary role in formulating and enacting. After World War II, a new regime of international law was instituted. Its provisions on laws of war are codified in the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and the Nurembergprinciples, adopted by the General Assembly. The Charter bars
11
authorized by the Security Council or, under Article 51, in self-defense against armed attack until the Security Council acts. In 2004, a high level UN panel, including, among others, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, concluded that “Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope 15 . .. In a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of nonintervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.” The National Security Strategy of September 2002, just largely reiterated inMarch, grants 16 the US the right to carry out 17 what it calls “pre-emptive war,” which means not preemptive, but “preventive war.” That’s the right to commit aggression, plain and simple. In the wording of the Nuremberg Tribunal, aggression is “the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
11
14
the threat or use of...
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