Petrocaribe

policy paper 40

Petrocaribe: The Current Phase of Venezuela’s Oil Diplomacy in the Caribbean*
Francine Jácome**
Introduction
The integrationist movement that has been under way through the first decade of the 21st century in Latin America and the Caribbean has been marked by two fundamental factors (Benítez, Celi and Jácome, 2010). The first one is the growing fragmentation anddisintegration at the continental level, as a number of countries (Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean) have turned more toward the north, whereas South America has sought to promote an identity that has been unable to overcome the differences between two blocs: on the one hand, the Andean region, where tensions and conflicts among neighboring countries have increased in recent years; and the SouthernCone, on the other hand, which has worked to advance mutual trust measures and peacekeeping operations especially within the framework of the United Nations. These differences have had an important impact on perceptions about the main threats faced by countries in terms of security and defense, as well as on the agendas and mechanisms that are designed to address them, thus resulting in a setbackfor regional cooperation on these issues despite the creation and implementation of new regional bodies such as the South American Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Moreover, this opposition between two different views on Latin American and Caribbean has recently played itself out in the Caribbean, especially as ties between Brazil and Cuba have grown stronger and asSuriname and Guyana have entered UNASUR.

Noviembre de 2011

The second factor is related to the ongoing weakening of democratic systems in many countries in the continent and to the increased influence of actors such as drug traffickers and organized crime, which has worsened states’ many preexisting problems and become a threat for democratic governance—namely, the incidence of violence,and its recent escalation, resulting from the expansion of non-state armed actors. Even the Caribbean has been touched by this phenomenon. In addition to these two elements, there are some additional factors playing a role, such as the impact of natural disasters and environmental problems, and the role of the United States and other extra-regional actors, especially the European Union (with itsclose ties to most Caribbean countries) and the growing presence of Russia and China in the region. Within this context, it has been argued that public debates on defense and security cooperation should include a series of new topics. Some of them have to do with (1) access to natural resources (water, gas) and environmental problems, (2) growing social and political unrest, (3) the role ofnon-state armed actors, (4) small arms and light weapons trafficking, and (5) the militarization of security. It is also important to consider, on the one hand, the growing participation of armed forces in the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking and in the management of security at the domestic level; and, on the other hand, the militarization of police institutions. Within this framework,this paper’s main objective is to examine the role of Venezuela’s so-called “oil diplomacy” in the Caribbean sub-region. For this purpose, two fundamental issues

are addressed: first, the components of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples’ Trade Agreement (ALBA-TCP) for the Caribbean; and, secondly, Petrocaribe’s initiative currently covering 18 countries: Antigua andBarbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Venezuela. The second section provides some considerations regarding possible future scenarios.

Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad Regional

ALBA in the Caribbean...