Productos
Páginas: 4 (936 palabras)
Publicado: 5 de septiembre de 2010
LA IMPORTANCIA DEL DISEÑO DE PRODUCTOS
Abstract (Summary)
Product design decision has significant impacts on firm's competitive edge. In a distribution channel, product design strategy of amanufacturer depends not only on its own decisions, but also on the behaviors of its upstream and downstream partners along the channel. This paper investigates the optimal product design strategy of amanufacturer in a two-stage supply chain that consists of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer. Customers are classified into two groups (i.e., two market segments) according to theirdifference on quality valuations. For each of the two potential market segments, the manufacturer needs to decide if it is beneficial to design a product with appropriate quality level to meet the demandof customers in the market segment. The retailer procures the product from the manufacturer, and then sells to customers at a retail price. By considering the interactions between the manufacturerand the retailer, this paper first describes the product design problem as a manufacturer-dominant Stackelberg game, and presents the optimal product design strategy for the manufacturer. To improvethe performance of the supply chain, the revenue-sharing contract is then introduced into the product design problem. It is found that the revenue-sharing contract can perfectly coordinate thedistribution channel in the product design problem. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of customer characteristics on the optimal product design strategies. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
El diseño denuevos productos es crucial para la supervivencia de la mayoría de las empresas. Aunque existen algunas firmas que experimentan muy poco cambio en sus productos, la mayoría de las compañías debenrevisarlas en forma constante. En las industrias que cambian con rapidez, la introducción de nuevos productos es una forma de vida y se han desarrollado enfoques muy sofisticados para presentar nuevos...
Abstract (Summary)
Product design decision has significant impacts on firm's competitive edge. In a distribution channel, product design strategy of amanufacturer depends not only on its own decisions, but also on the behaviors of its upstream and downstream partners along the channel. This paper investigates the optimal product design strategy of amanufacturer in a two-stage supply chain that consists of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer. Customers are classified into two groups (i.e., two market segments) according to theirdifference on quality valuations. For each of the two potential market segments, the manufacturer needs to decide if it is beneficial to design a product with appropriate quality level to meet the demandof customers in the market segment. The retailer procures the product from the manufacturer, and then sells to customers at a retail price. By considering the interactions between the manufacturerand the retailer, this paper first describes the product design problem as a manufacturer-dominant Stackelberg game, and presents the optimal product design strategy for the manufacturer. To improvethe performance of the supply chain, the revenue-sharing contract is then introduced into the product design problem. It is found that the revenue-sharing contract can perfectly coordinate thedistribution channel in the product design problem. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of customer characteristics on the optimal product design strategies. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
El diseño denuevos productos es crucial para la supervivencia de la mayoría de las empresas. Aunque existen algunas firmas que experimentan muy poco cambio en sus productos, la mayoría de las compañías debenrevisarlas en forma constante. En las industrias que cambian con rapidez, la introducción de nuevos productos es una forma de vida y se han desarrollado enfoques muy sofisticados para presentar nuevos...
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