Saving Syria: Assessing Options

MIDDLE EAST
memo
MARCH 2012 MEMO #21

Saving Syria: Assessing Options for Regime Change
Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Kenneth Pollack, and Salman Shaikh
Syria is trapped on a crumbling precipice,
and however it might fall will entail significant risks for the United States and for the Syrian people. The brutal regime of Bashar al-Asad is employing its loyal military forces and sectarianthugs to crush the opposition and reassert its tyranny. Even if Bashar fails, Syria may not be out of the woods: an increasingly likely alternative to the current regime is a bloody civil war similar to what we saw in Lebanon, Bosnia, Congo, and most recently in Iraq. The horrors of such a war might even exceed the brutal reassertion of Asad’s control, and would cause spillover into Syria’sneighbors—Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel—that could be disastrous for them and for American interests in the Middle East.1 But the unrest in Syria, which is now entering its second year, also offers some important opportunities, ones that would come from the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Asad, whose family has ruled the country with an iron grip for over forty years. Syria is Iran’s oldest andmost important ally in the Arab world, and the Iranian regime has doubled down on Asad, providing him with financial aid and military support to shore up his regime. Asad’s departure would deal a significant blow to Tehran, further isolating it at a time when it has few friends in the region or the world. In addition, Damascus is steadfast in its hostility toward Israel, and Asad’s regime is also alongtime supporter of terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas, and has at times aided al-Qa’ida terrorists and former regime elements in Iraq. The regime’s collapse, therefore, could have significant benefits for the United States and its allies in the region. Actually ousting Asad, however, will not be easy. Although the Obama administration has for months called for Asad to go, every policyoption to remove him is flawed, and some could even make the situation worse—seemingly a recipe for inaction. Doing nothing, however, means standing by while Asad murders his own people, and Syria plunges into civil war and risks becoming a failed state. Already the violence is staggering: as of March 2012, at least 8,000 Syrians have died and thousands more have been arrested and tortured intrying to topple the regime. At the same time, Syria is fragmenting. The Syrian opposition remains divided, and the Free Syrian Army is more a brand than a meaningful, unified force. AlQa’ida is urging fighters to join the fray in Syria, and sectarian killings and atrocities are growing. Should the violence continue to intensify, Syria’s neighbors may increase their meddling, and instability couldspread, further weakening already-fragile neighbors like Iraq and Lebanon. So to protect U.S. interests, Asad cannot triumph. But a failed Syria, one wracked by civil war, would be just as bad. Thus, U.S. policy must walk this tightrope, trying to remove Asad, but doing so in a way that keeps Syria an intact state capable of policing its borders and ensuring order at home. At the end of the day,however, removing Asad may not be doable

at a price the United States is willing to pay. If so, the U.S. government may be forced to choose between living with a brutal but weakened Asad or getting rid of Asad regardless of the consequences. This memo lays out six options for the United States to consider to achieve Asad’s overthrow, should it choose to do so: 1. Removing the regime via diplomacy;2. Coercing the regime via sanctions and diplomatic isolation; 3. Arming the Syrian opposition to overthrow the regime; 4. Engaging in a Libya-like air campaign to help an opposition army gain victory; 5. Invading Syria with U.S.-led forces and toppling the regime directly; and 6. Participating in a multilateral, NATO-led effort to oust Asad and rebuild Syria. The options are complex, and...