yo y yo

E C O N O M Í A

TESIS de MAGÍSTER

IInstituto
N S T I de
T Economía
U T O
D E

DOCUMENTO
DE TRABAJO

2012

Indicadores de Colusión en el Mercado Farmacéutico Chileno

Víctor Serey.

www.economia.puc.cl

´
PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA
DE CHILE
´
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA
MAGISTER EN ECONOM´IA

TESIS DE GRADO
MAGISTER EN ECONOM´IA

´n
˜ iga, V´ıctor Daniel
Serey,Zu

Agosto, 2012

palabra

´
PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA
DE CHILE
´
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA
MAGISTER EN ECONOM´IA

´ n en el Mercado
Indicadores de Colusio
´utico Chileno
Farmace

por
´n
˜ iga
V´ıctor Daniel Serey Zu

´
COMISION:
ALEJANDRA TRAFERRI
AR´ISTIDES TORCHE
´ RAU
TOMAS

Agosto, 2012
Santiago, Chile

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´Indice
1. Introducci´
onXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

1

2. Detectando un Cartel
¿Qu´e entendemos por colusi´on?
¿Qu´e sabemos de los carteles detectados?
Ambig¨
uedades entre la teor´ıa y la evidencia

4
4
5
7

3. El Caso de Colusi´
on de las Farmacias
Contexto y desarrollo del mercado farmac´eutico en Chile
Caracter´ısticas de los productos cuestionados por la FNE
La acusaci´on y el fallo del TDLC
Antecedentesadicionales

10
10
11
12
16

4. Metodolog´ıa: Indicadores de Colusi´
on
Correlaci´on entre precio y demanda
Estabilidad de precios
Correlaci´on entre los precios
Correlaci´on entre cuotas de mercado

18
19
20
22
22

5. Descripci´
on de los datos
Sobre la base de datos y los medicamentos
Sobre los precios considerados
Comportamiento a nivel agregado
Sobre las cuotas demercado

25
25
26
29
31

6. Resultados
CM1: Correlaci´on entre precio y cantidad
CM2: Estabilidad de precios
CM3: Correlaci´on entre precios
CM4 y CM5: Indicadores de cuotas de mercado
Resumen de resultados

34
35
42
48
49
57

7. Discusi´
on
Usando la informaci´on inculpatoria
Sobre los costos
Extensiones del presente trabajo

59
60
66
68

8. Conclusi´
on

70Referencias

72

Anexos

75

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study new evidence of collusion emerging from the pricing
behavior in the famous case of the Chilean pharmacies. For that purpose, I use a set of
collusive markers reviewed by Joe Harrington (2008) based on theoretical and empirical
literature on collusion. These markers exploit the fact that particularcorrelations between
prices, quantities and market shares are expected under collusion.
In order to evaluate these markers, I use the transactional database of sales, for 220 disputed drugs, covering from January 2006 to December 2008. These were reported by each of
the three questioned pharmacies (Cruz Verde, Farmacias Ahumada y Salcobrand) to the
authority.
The main result is that almost half ofthe disputed drugs met simultaneously all the
markers. This result provides independent evidence favoring a collusive hypothesis which,
complemented with criminal evidence, shows that the pricing behavior is highly consistent
with collusive explanations. For drugs that do not exhibit a seasonal pattern of demand,
the classical result of Rotemberg & Saloner (1986) of negative correlationbetween price
and demand is confirmed. Likewise, for drugs following a seasonal pattern of demand, I
found agreement with the price behavior predicted by Haltiwanger & Harrington (1991).
It is also confirmed that, during the period identified by the authority like collusion, the
drugs prices show greater stability and more positive correlation compared to the behavior
during 2006 (competiveperiod). Market shares are also more stable during this period
for most of the drugs, while for others there is evidence of non-rational behavior for a
competitive regime.

iii

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Resumen

El principal objetivo de esta tesis es estudiar nueva evidencia econ´omica que surge de los
indicadores de colusi´on compendiados de la literatura por Joe Harrington (2008), para el
bullado caso...