Киевская Русь

The Role of the Individual in History

by G. V. Plekhanov

I

In the second half of the seventies the late Kablitz wrote an article entitled, "The Mind and the Senses as Factors of Progress," in which, referring to Spencer, he argued that the senses played the principal role in human progress, and that the mind played only a secondary role, and quite a subordinate one at that. A certain"esteemed sociologist" replied to Kablitz, expressing amusemqnt and surprise at a theory which placed the mind "on the fdotboard." The "esteemed sociologist" was right, of course, in defending the mind. He would have been much more right, however, had he proved without going into the details of the question that Kablitz had raised, that his very method of presentjng it was impossible andimpermissible.
Indeed, the "factors" theory is unsound in itself, for it arbitrarily picks out different sides of social life, hypostasizes them, converts them into forces of a special kind, which, from different sides and with unequal success, draw the social man along the path of progress. But this theory is still less sound in the form presented by Kablitz, who converted into special sociologicalhypostases, not the various sides of the activities of the social man,  but the different spheres of the individual mind.  This is a veritable Herculean pillar of abstraction; beyond this one cannot go, for beyond it lies the comic kingdom of utter and obvious absurdity. It is to this that the "esteemed sociologist" should have drawn the attention of Kablitz and his readers.
Perhaps, after revealing thedepths of abstraction into which the effort to find the predominating "factor" in history had led Kablitz, the "esteemed sociologist" might, by chance, have made some contribution to the critique of this "factors" theory. This would have been very useful for all of us at that time. But he proved unequal to his mission. He himself subscribed to that theory, differing from Kablitz only in hisleanings toward eclecticism,   and, consequently, all the "factors" seemed to him equally important. Subsequently, the eclectic nature of his mind found particularly striking expression in his attacks on dialectical materialism, which he regarded as a doctrine that sacrifices all other factors to the economic "factor" and reduces the role of the individual in history to nothing. It never occurred to the"esteemed sociologist" that the "factors" point of view is alien to dialectical materialism, and that only one who is utterly incapable of thinking logically can see in it any justification of so-called quietism.  Incidentally, it must be observed that the slip made by our "esteemed sociologist" is not unique; very many others have made it, are making it and, probably, will go on making it.Materialists were accused of leanings toward quietism even before they had worked out their dialectical conception of nature and of history. Without making an excursion into the "depth of time," we will recall the controversy between the celebrated English scientists, Priestley and Price. Analyzing Priestley's theories, Price argued that materialism was incompatible with the concept of free will, andthat it precluded all independent activity on the part of the individual. In reply Priestly referred to everyday experience. He would not speak of himself, he said, though by no means the most apathetic of creatures, but where would one find more mental vigor, more activity, more force and persistence in the pursuit of extremely important aims than among those who subscribe to the doctrine ofnecessity? Priestley had in view the religious, democratic sect they known as Christian Necessarians.[1] We do not know whether this sect was as active as Priestley, who belonged to it, thought it was. But that is not important.
There can be not the slightest doubt that the materialist conception of the human will is quite compatible with the most vigorous practical activity. Lanson observes that...