Caso Cannon

Canon also recognizes that its continued market success depends on its ability to exploit new research into marketable products quickly. It has worked hard to reduce the new product introduction cycle through a cross-functional programme called TS 1/2 whose purpose is to cut development time by 50 percent on a continuous basis. The main thrust of this programme is the classification ofdevelopment projects by total time required and the critical human resources needed so that these two parameters can be optimized for each product depending on its importance for Canon’s corporate strategy. This allows product teams to be formed around several classifications of product development priorities of which “best sellers” will receive the most emphasis. These are the products aimed at new marketsor segments with large potential demands. Other classifications include products necessary to catch up with competitive offerings, product refinements intended to enhance customer satisfaction, and long—run marathon products which will take considerable time to develop. In all development classifications, Canon emphasizes three factors to reduce time to market: the fostering of engineeringability, efficient technical support systems, and careful reviews of product development at all stages.
Canon is also working to divert its traditional product focus into more of a market focus. To this end, Canon R&D
personnel participate in international product strategy meetings, carry out consumer research, join in marketing activities, and attend meetings in the field at both domestic and foreignsales subsidiaries.
MARKETING
Canon’s effective marketing is the result of step-by-step, calculated introduction strategies. Normally, the product is first introduced and perfected in the home market before being sold internationally. Canon has learned how to capture learning from the Japanese market quickly so that the time span between introduction in Japan and abroad is as short as a fewmonths. Furthermore, the company will not simultaneously launch a new product through a new distribution channel—its strategy is to minimize risk by introducing a new product through known channels first. New channels will only be created, if necessary, after the product has proven to be successful.
The launch of the NP copier exemplifies this strategy. Canon initially sold these copiers in Japan bydirect sales through its Business Machines Sales organization, ‘which had been set up in 1968 to sell the calculator product line. This sales organization was merged with the camera sales organization in1971 to form Canon Sales. By 1972, after three years of experience in producing the NP product line, the company entered into a new distribution channel, that of dealers, to supplement directselling.
The NP copier line was not marketed in the US until 1974, after production and distribution were running smoothly in Japan. The US distribution system was similar to that used in Japan, with seven sales subsidiaries for direct selling and a network of independent dealers.
By the late 1970s, Canon had built up a strong dealer network in the US which supported both sales and service of thecopiers. The dealer channel was responsible for rapid growth in copier sales, and, by the early 1980s, Canon copiers were sold almost exclusively through this channel. Canon enthusiastically supported the dealers with attractive sales incentive programs, management training and social outings. Dealers were certified to sell copiers only after completing a course in service training. The companyfelt that a close relationship with its dealers was a vital asset that allowed it to understand and react to customer’s needs and problems in a timely manner. At the same time, Canon also maintained a direct selling mechanism through wholly owned sales subsidiaries in Japan, the US and Europe in order to target large customers and government accounts. The introduction of its low-end personal copier...