La Policia

Thomas Aquinas’ De Regno: Political Philosophy, Theocracy, and Esoteric Writing
2007 Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference Presented by: Patrick Cain (Baylor University) Patrick_Cain@Baylor.edu

Although the growth of neo-Thomist scholarship in the past century has led to a resurgence in the scholarship devoted to Thomas Aquinas’ political thought, much of the attention hasfocused on the account of politics given in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, with very limited attention being paid to his De Regno. Indeed, even the scholarship that takes account of De Regno subordinates it to the Summa, attempting to fit it into the account of politics given there. There are two drawbacks to such an approach. First, as its title suggests, and its first question makes clear, the Summais a work of theology rather than political science. In contrast, the aim of Aquinas’ treatise on kingship is overtly political – De Regno is written to the King of Cyprus. And while it may be replied that theology encompasses the study of politics, it is also clear that they are distinguishable fields of study.1 The second drawback parallels the first. The subordination of De Regno – by which Imean the attempt to make De Regno a part of the argument of the Summa – fails to take account of the context in which the arguments are presented. 2 It is not surprising, then, that many commentators struggle to reconcile the arguments of the two works, particularly the problem that the Summa favors a mixed regime while De Regno favors kingship. Conversely, we intend to show that when thearguments of De Regno are viewed in light of the context of the work itself, the treatise turns out to have a deeper teaching than its arguments first reveal. De Regno treats two issues inseparable from the roots of political philosophy: the best form of government and the problem of tyranny. It is my contention that Aquinas addresses these two issues by presenting theology as an alternative to thetradition of ancient political philosophy and, in so doing, attempts a new founding of politics that aims at a government that addresses the ideal form of the government while simultaneously securing that government against the danger of tyranny. This reformulation of both the best form of government and the possibility of that government being instituted on earth depends on Aquinas’ account of theproper reward of the king, an account that removes the limits on the good allowed by a political life by reorienting that life toward the unlimited good of God. My argument has two parts. First, I explore Aquinas’ account of government, attempting to reconcile the claim that kingship is the best and safest form of government with his pressing concern for the prevention of tyranny. Here I show that thereconciliation of these two aims depends upon an extraordinarily strict definition of kingship that only becomes clear upon a close reading of the text. I argue that because this strict definition is almost impossible to fulfill,
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Aquinas writes: “Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formalaspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts”. 2 Forexamples of such approaches see: John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 262; Mark C. Murphy, “Consent, Custom, and the Common Good in Aquinas's Account of Political Authority”, The Review of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 2. (Spring, 1997), pp. 323-350; James M. Blythe, “The Mixed Constitution and the Distinction between Regal and Political...