Is a Social Science Of Human Rights Possible?

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IS A SOCIAL SCIENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS POSSIBLE?
AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL PREUNDERSTANDINGS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
Each of us must make truth and knowledge his own.
John Locke

In order to answer this question we have to focus our attention in a metatheoretical matter, that is, on how science works. In our particular case we must consider how the "science of human rights"works.
To be familiar with the development of human rights let us begin by asserting that the study of human rights constitutes a social science. And science as part of knowledge in general is: "knowledge arranged in an orderly manner..." (Oxford Dictionary, 1974) Now, to analyze whether it is possible to found a social science of human rights we need to know what the methodology of such a scienceis. Moreover, we are required to speculate on the nature of science, its method and process.
Everyday thinking uses a process whereby we start from premises about the world and reach, by rational means, conclusions about the world that cannot be reached from those premises by deduction alone; but science is more systematic and method-conscious. Science is "Knowledge amassed, severely tested,co-ordinated, and systematized, ..." (Webster's Dictionary, 1949). Apart from prediction, prescription and control, the main purpose of science is perhaps description and explanation. In addition, an important part of the metatheory concerns what this is and how it is achieved. Furthermore, what, if any, are the specific logical constructions of, or particular methods for, social sciences andspecifically for the social science of human rights?
Also there are two aspects of all sciences concerning knowledge i.e. theoretical and practical features. We have that division even in physics and mathematics, and normally those who are "well skilled" in one are not necessarily good in the other. These two parts of knowledge are just portions of human intelligence. Following Steinberger, we can affirmthat "We recognize that there is often a very great difference between being wise and being knowledgeable, that persons of substantial analytical strength are not always persons of prudence and good judgment, that the skills and habits of the intellectual are quite different from those of the practitioner." (Steinberger, 1993: 2)
Another point we need to clarify is that human rights present, atleast, a double perspective. First, we can see them from a mere legal and positive viewpoint; in that case human rights are just legal norms and principles that need to be understood, interpreted and applied. From this "legalistic" and positivistic point of view, it is possible to say that it is acceptable and convenient to apply all the juridical methods of reasoning, analyzing, thinking andinterpreting the subject. For the purpose of the present essay we are going to asseverate that human rights are rights, that they are part of international public law. We are going to take for granted that they exist as rights justified and granted in the international treaties. Taking that view we also assert, as a second dimension, that they need the wider perspective that a philosophical andpolitical approach offers. This is a second order cognizance (conceptualization). It is on this latter methodological dimension that we are going to focus our attention in the present essay, i.e. the philosophical and political prerequirements for a science of human rights.
The analytical and purely deductive theoretical knowledge that tends to rely on notions of instrumental rationality to techniquein social sciences, hence in the political arena, seems to be inadequate for the subject matter. Knowledge based on analytical and deductive structures belongs to the realm of cognition, the realm of logic, mathematics, and the strict sciences. Its truth is coercive, it precludes debate and it must be mostly accepted by every individual in possession of his rational faculties. But in humanities...