Safeguards To Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

(updated September 2011)

Most countries participate in international initiatives designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The international safeguards system has since 1970 successfully prevented the diversion of fissile materials into weapons. Its scope has been widened to address undeclared nuclear activities.
The IAEAundertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities and audits the movement of nuclear materials through them.
Safeguards are backed by diplomatic and economic measures.
The initial development of nuclear technology was military, during World War II. Two nuclear bombs made from uranium-235 and plutonium-239 were dropped on Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively in August 1945 and thesebrought the long war to a sudden end. The immense and previously unimaginable power of the atom had been demonstrated. Then attention turned to civil applications. In the course of half a century nuclear technology has enabled access to a virtually unlimited source of energy at a time when constraints are arising on the use of fossil fuels. The question which frames this paper is: To what extentand in what ways does nuclear power generation contribute to or alleviate the risk from nuclear weapons?

In the 1960s it was widely assumed at there would be 30-35 nuclear weapons states by the turn of the century. In fact there were eight - a tremendous testimony to the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its incentives both against weapons and for civil nuclearpower, despite the baleful influence of the Cold War (1950s to 80s) which saw a massive build-up of nuclear weapons particularly by the USA and the Soviet Union.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is much more than the NPT, although this is the pre-eminent international treaty on the subject. The regime includes treaties, conventions and common (multilateral and bilateral) arrangements coveringsecurity and physical protection, export controls, nuclear test-bans and, potentially, fissile material production cut-offs. The international community can apply pressure to states outside the NPT to make every possible effort to conform to the full range of international norms on nuclear non-proliferation that make up this regime. This was seen over 2007-08 with India.

The NPT Origins andObjectives

Over the past 35 years the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into military uses. It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil uranium, plutonium and associated plants are used only forpeaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely. Its scope is also being widened to include undeclared nuclear activities.

Most countries have renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possession of them would threaten rather than enhance national security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as apublic commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful purposes.

The successful conclusion, in 1968, of negotiations on the NPT was a landmark in the history of non-proliferation. After coming into force in 1970, its indefinite extension in May 1995 was another. The NPT was essentially an agreement among the five nuclear weapons states and the other countries interested innuclear technology. The deal was that assistance and cooperation would be traded for pledges, backed by international scrutiny, that no plant or material would be diverted to weapons' use. Those who refused to be part of the deal would be excluded from international cooperation or trade involving nuclear technology.

At present, 187 states are party to the NPT. These include all five declared...