Feyerabend's Epistemological Anarchism

Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism

Lohitzune Rodriguez

Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism
The aim of this essay is to explain the main thesis of the epistemolgical theory advanced by the Austrian philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend in the late XX. century and to further develop this explanation by a set of arguments which support the thesis. In doing so, I will be using, mostly,the same arguments given by the philosopher, while I may also add arguments or theory outlines by other philosophers which I might consider as helpful in my exposition. The central idea of epistemological anarchism can be expressed in just two words: "anything goes". According to Feyerabend, while political anarchism may not be a good choice, epistemological anarchism is an "excellent medicine"for both science and philosophy of science. There are several reasons to believe this statement and they can be divided into three mayor thesis, which will also determine the parts of this essay: 1) It is not true that there's a rationality in the history of science, 2) any method which could try to explain such non-existing rationality as well as define any future scientific activity is bad forthe progress of science, and 3) since "anything goes", science shouldn't have a prevailing sacred role in society, for this confronts freedom and human well-being. Anything Goes: rebutting scientific rationality in history Feyerabend starts his most famous book, Against Method, by presenting some quotations from various authors which support the idea that history is not as lineal and, let's say,rational as we usually believe; on the contrary, it is rather constituted by a bunch of accidents and given situations which do indeed express how complicated human change and its consequences can be. Later, with an interrogative formula, he concludes: "are we really to believe that the naive and simple-minded rules which methodologists take as their guide are capable of accounting for such a 'mazeof interactions'? And is it not clear that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible only for a ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular philosophy and who adopts whatever procedure seems to fit the occassion?" (1975a: 17-18). Let's stick, for now, to his first question-thesis, which we can explain as follows: methodology hasn't played an important role (if any)in making science progress (although in the first part of the introduction he was talking about history in general, we can foresee his point).

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Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism

Lohitzune Rodriguez

Regarding rationality in history of science, Feyerabend claims that "science knows no 'bare fact' at all but that the 'facts' that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certainway and are, therefore, essentially ideational" (1975a: 19). What he means by saying so, is that any data about facts is based on observation, and since this is made by humans who inevitably find themselves in a whole cultural and ideological context, the reasearch will be, since the very beginning, pushed in a certain direction, that is to say, the observational method as well as theinterpretation of the data obtained through it will be conditioned by the cultural and ideological bagage mentioned before. The so called 'Gestalt effect' gives good example of what it's been said here. However, we are not talking here about cultural paradigms which would condition the scientist; it would rather be a mixture of two sides of a coin, the scientist's observation is conditioned by, the culturalcontext in which he find himself, but also, by his own individuality and uniqueness. The author better explains the latter by saying that "this being the case, science will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as are the minds of those who invented them" (1975a:...