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Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind
Moses Abramovitz
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 46, No. 2, The Tasks of Economic History. (Jun., 1986),
pp. 385-406.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28198606%2946%3A2%3C385%3ACUFAAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G
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C atching U p , F orging Ahead, and

Falling Behind

A w idely entertained hypothesis holds that, in comparisons among countries,
productivity growth rates tend to vary inversely with productivity levels. A
c entury of experience in a group of presently industrialized countries supports this
hypothesis and the convergence ofproductivity levels it implies. The rate of
convergence, however, varied from period to period and showed marked strength
only during the first quarter-century following World War 11. T he general process
of convergence was also accompanied by dramatic shifts in countries' productivity rankings. The paper extends the simple catch-up hypothesis to rationalize the
fluctuating strength of the process andexplores the connections between convergence itself and the relative success of early leaders and latecomers.

A

MONG the many explanations of the surge of productivity growth
during the quarter century following World War 11, the most
prominent is the hypothesis that the countries of the industrialized
"West" were able to bring into production a large backlog of
unexploited technology.The principal part of this backlog is deemed to
have consisted of methods of production and of industrial and commercial organization already in use in the United States at the end of the
war, but not yet employed in the other countries of the West. In this
hypothesis, the United States is viewed as the "leader," the other
countries as "followers" who had the opportunity to "catch up." Inconformity with this view, a waning of the opportunity for catching up
is frequently advanced as an explanation of the retardation in productivity growth suffered by the same group of followers since 1973.
Needless to say, the size of the initial backlog and its subsequent
reduction are rarely offered as sole explanations of the speedup and
slowdown, but they stand as important parts of the story.T hese views about postwar following and catching up suggest a more
general hypothesis that the productivity levels of countries tend to
converge. And this in turn brings to mind old questions about the
emergence of new leaders and the historical and theoretical puzzles that
Journal of Economic History, Vol. X LVI, No. 2 (June 1986). O The Economic History
Association. All rights reserved....