Ortega Y Gasset

McKinnon: Issues in Political Theory 2e Chapter 1: Political Authority and Obligation Case Study: Conscription Keith Hyams’ chapter introduced us to the so-called ‘problem of political obligation’ – the problem, that is, of explaining on what grounds we are under a moral duty to obey the commands of the state. That problem may not appear too pressing when what the state requires of us isundemanding, and we are not motivated to act otherwise, as in, say, the case of laws forbidding murder. It becomes particularly acute, however, when what the state demands of us is very arduous, and/or we have strong principled objections to doing as we are told. Consider, as a prime example, compulsory military service, whereby citizens are called upon by the state to risk life and limb in the theatre ofwar, and perhaps to engage in an activity which almost everyone believes to be highly morally problematic, and a non-negligible number believes to be fundamentally and without exception prohibited – to wit, the killing of other human beings. On what grounds can states claim the right to order their citizens to go to war, then? And how should it treat those who refuse to serve, on moral orreligious grounds? This case study examines these questions. But first, it will help to examine some of the details of an existing system of compulsory military service, and resistance to it. A large number of countries have, or have had in recent history, a system of conscription, but perhaps the best-known and most discussed contemporary example is that of Israel. (Another well-known scheme was that ofGermany, but this was finally wound down in 2011, after 55 years). Compulsory military service in the Israeli Defense Force is provided for by the Defense Service Law, passed in 1949, and updated in 1959 and 1986. Under this law, both men and women are eligible for conscription from the age of 18 – with men typically serving up to 30 months, and women up to 24. Women are exempt from service ifmarried, pregnant, or mothers. In addition, and interestingly enough, the Defense Service Law also allows women, but not men, exemption from military service for reasons of conscience or religious observance. Further exemptions from compulsory service can also be granted at the discretion of the Minister of Defense, and students enrolled in yeshivas (Jewish seminaries) have benefited from aministerial exemption since 1948. This arrangement was originally justified on grounds that the yeshiva students were, like those undertaking military service, making an important contribution to the survival of the Jewish people (in their case, by rebuilding Jewish religious heritage after the holocaust). But the exemption has been resented as unfair by some serving soldiers (Klosko, 2005, 170), and waschallenged (unsuccessfully) in a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court in 1986 (Ressler and others v. Minister of Defense, H.C. 910/86). Unauthorised conscientious refusal is a perennially controversial issue in Israel, and is often punished with court marshals and imprisonment. There are two kinds of ‘refuseniks’ – those who refuse military service altogether, and those who enrol, but

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McKinnon: Issues in Political Theory 2e selectively refuse to follow particular orders, or fight in particular campaigns. Among the latter group are two prominent movements – ‘Yesh Gvul’ (meaning ‘there is a limit’), which was founded in 1982 by soldiers who refused to participate in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and ‘Courage to Refuse’, formedin 2002 by soldiers refusing to serve in the occupied Palestinian territories. Among those who advocate wholesale refusal to serve, meanwhile, are the ‘Shministim’ (literally ‘twelfth graders’), a group comprised of highschool students and leavers. Perhaps the most high-profile case of conscientious refusal involving this group was that of Yoni Ben Artzi, nephew of current Israeli Prime Minister...