Creativity As Flexible Cognitive Control

Creativity as Flexible Cognitive Control
By: Darya L. Zabelina
Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University
Michael D. Robinson
Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University
Abstract:
Creative individuals have been described in terms suggestive of greater automatic processing (e.g., defocused attention, looser associations) and greater controlled processing (e.g.,greater abilities to focus while working on a creative task). Both views cannot be correct from a static ability-related perspective. On the other hand, both views could be correct if creative individuals are better able to modulate the functioning of their cognitive control system in a context-sensitive manner. The present study (N = 50) assessed individual differences in creativity in terms oforiginal responses on the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974) and also in terms of creative behavior on the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). The same participants performed a color–word Stroop task. Creative individuals were neither more nor less capable of overriding cognitive conflicts on incongruent (relative to congruent) Stroop trials.On the other hand, creative individuals displayed more flexible cognitive control, as defined by greater cognitive control modulation from trial to trial. Implications for theories of creativity and its underlying processing basis are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) (from the journal abstract)

Acknowledgement: Darya L. Zabelina acknowledges support from aNational Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Darya L. Zabelina, Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University, Department 2765, P.O. Box 6050, Fargo, ND 58108-6050 Electronic Mail may be sent to: darya.zabelina@ndsu.
Although both automatic and controlled processes seem to characterize creative thinking in someuncertain combination, theories of creativity tend to emphasize one or the other somewhat exclusively. Psychodynamic theories of creativity tout the value of reliance on more primitive, primary-process thinking as a source of creative insight and production (e.g., Kris, 1952). Gardner (1982) has similarly suggested that creative thinking is childlike in nature and presumably spontaneous andautomatic for this reason. A particular sort of theory of this type emphasizes the importance of unfocused or defocused attention in facilitating creative performance (Eysenck, 1995; Kasof, 1997). Defocused attention would necessarily be associated with low levels of cognitive control according to contemporary theories of executive attention (Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart,2005).
Such automaticity views of creativity can be contrasted with other theories emphasizing the importance of controlled processes. Especially high levels of creativity seem to require some degree of focused mental efforts (e.g., Groborz & Nęcka, 2003). Indeed, it seems quite unlikely that any creative idea would result in creative behaviors to the extent that there was no persistence inpursuing it (Feist, 1999). In neurobiological terms, it is quite apparent that the cognitive control capabilities of the human being, relative to other animal species, permit far less reliance on rigid stimulus–response associations and far greater capacities for creative thinking (Fuster, 1995; Stuss & Knight, 2002). By extension, human cognition that is more creative would utilize thecognitive control circuits of the brain to transcend mundane overlearned associations (Miller & Cohen, 2001).
On the basis of such theories and sources of data, should lower or higher levels of cognitive control facilitate creative thinking and behavior? We contend that there appears to be no easy answer to this question. On the one hand, lower levels of cognitive control may facilitate the sorts...