Cuuotas De Pesca En Australia

Marine Policy 24 (2000) 109 }117

Individual transferable catch quotas: Australian experience in the
southern blue"n tuna "shery
David Campbell *, Debbie Brown , Tony Battaglene
15 Laycock Pl. Holt, ACT, 2615, Australia
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, GPO Box 1563, ACT 2601, Australia
Fish Programs Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch, Department of PrimaryIndustries and Energy. GPO Box 858, Canberra 2601, Australia
Accepted 1 May 1999

Abstract
The use of individual transferable catch quota in Australia's southern blue"n tuna "shery resulted in a number of positive outcomes
including a rapid adjustment of the "shery which bene"ted those who left the "shery, those remaining in the "shery and society as
a whole. It is highly likely that many of thesebene"ts would have been foregone had individual transferable catch quota not been
introduced into the "shery.
2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Individual transferable catch quota; Adjustment; Restructuring; Tuna; Conservation; International cooperation; Fishing e!ort; Welfare
distribution

The fundamental problem in most Australian "sheries
has been that "shing e!ortand investment has expanded
beyond the point where the value of the "shery is maximised. In an e!ort to reduce "shing activity to a more
e$cient and sustainable level, "sheries managers in Australia have traditionally relied on input controls, such as
limits on the number of boats that can operate in a "shery, on boat capacity and on the amount of gear used.
However, the implementation ofinput controls is often
followed by increases in e!ort and investment with the
substitution of unconstrained for constrained inputs, and
technological improvements to inputs. The situation is
further compounded because input controls do not provide incentives for the removal of excess economic
capacity.
In 1989 the Australian Commonwealth government
identi"ed individual transferable catchquotas (ITCQs)
as the preferred "sheries management tool. Important in
the thinking leading to this conclusion is that ITCQs can
provide incentives for "shing operators to direct their
investment, "shing e!ort and resource use to maximise

the net value of the "shery [1]. Use of ITCQs can
also facilitate adjustment in "sheries where there is
excessive "shing e!ort by giving relatively ine$cientoperators and those with alternative employment opportunities the option of selling their quota and leaving the
"shery.
Currently only two Australian "sheries managed
by the Commonwealth government are managed using
ITCQs } the southern blue"n tuna (SBT) "shery and
the southeast "shery. While ITCQs were introduced
into the southeast "shery in 1992, restrictions on the
transferability ofindividual quota and other structural
impediments remained, and advantages of ITCQs were
not fully realised in this "shery [2,3], and the data
available on the changes that have occurred in this "shery are limited.
ITCQs were introduced into the SBT "shery in 1984
and have always been fully transferable. Since that time,
the "shery has gone through a number of adjustments,
some of which area direct result of the introduction
of ITCQs. However, while some adjustments are not
directly attributable to the introduction of ITCQs, their
use did facilitate these adjustments.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: #612-6272-2025; fax: #612-62541511.
E-mail address: dcampbell."sh@bigpond.com (D. Campbell).

 For a discussion of the conditions necessary for the application of
ITCQs see [3].1. Introduction

0308-597X/00/$ - see front matter
2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 3 0 8 - 5 9 7 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 1 7 - 2

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D. Campbell et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 109 } 117

2. Description of the 5shery
Southern blue"n tuna caught in the Australian "shing
zone are part of a highly migratory "sh stock found in the
southern oceans. Juvenile...