Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Author(s): Michael W. Doyle Source: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265298 Accessed: 12/08/2010 16:59
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contactinformation may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digitalarchive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact email@example.com.
Blackwell Publishing is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and Public Affairs.
MICHAEL DOYLE W.
Kant,LiberalLegacies, and ForeignAffairs*
IWhatdifferencedo liberalprinciplesand institutionsmake to the conduct of the foreign affairsof liberal states? A thicket of conflictingjudgments suggests that the legacies of liberalismhave not been clearlyappreciated. For many citizens of liberalstates, liberalprinciplesand institutionshave so fully absorbeddomestic politics that their influence on foreign affairs tends to be eitheroverlookedaltogetheror, when perceived,exaggerated. Liberalism becomeseitherunself-consciously patriotic inherendy"peaceor loving." For many scholars and diplomats, the relations among independent states appearto differ so significantlyfromdomestic politics that influences of liberalprinciplesand domesticliberalinstitutionsare denied or denigrated. They judge that internationalrelations are governed byperceptions of national security and the balance of power; liberal principles and institutions, when they do intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-powerpolitics.'
* This is the first half of a two-partarticle.The articlehas benefitedfrom the extensive criticismsof WilliamAscher, RichardBetts, WilliamBundy,Joseph Carens, Felix Gilbert, Amy Gutmann,Don Herzog, Stanley Hoffman,MarionLevy,Judith Shklar,MarkUhlig, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. I have also tried to take into account suggestions from Fouad Ajami, Steven David, Tom Farer,RobertGilpin,Ernest van den Haag, GermaineHoston,RobertJervis,DonaldKagan,RobertKeohane,John Rawls,Nicholas Rizopoulos,RobertW. Tucker,RichardUllman,and the membersof a SpecialSeminar at the LehrmanInstitute,February I983. The essaycannotbe interpreted a consensus 22, as of their views. i. The liberal-patriotic view was reiteratedby PresidentReagan in a speech before the BritishParliament 8 June I982. There he proclaimed globalcampaignfor democratic on "a This "crusadefor freedom"will be the latest campaignin a traditionthat, development." he claimed, began with the MagnaCartaand stretchedin this century throughtwo world warsand a cold war. He added that liberal foreign policies have shown "restraint" and "peacefulintentions"and that this crusade will strengthen the prospects for a world at peace (New YorkTimes, 9 June I982). The skepticalscholarsand diplomatsrepresentthe predominant Realistinterpretation international of relations.See ns. 4 and I 2 forreferences.
Philosophy & Public Affairs
Leer documento completo
Regístrate para leer el documento completo.