Guerra del golfo
GULF WAR LOGISTICS: THEORY INTO PRACTICE
A Research Paper Presented To The Directorate of Research Air Command and Staff College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC
by Maj Brad D. Lafferty Maj Richard Huhn Lt Col Ghoneim M. Al-Shaibani Maj Judith B. Moses Maj Mario Reyes Maj Todd E. Behne Maj Joyce P. Napier Maj Debra Shattuck Maj MargaretM. Curran Maj Walter S. Nessmith Maj Brian D. Tri Maj James E. De Temple Maj Kathleen J.O’Regan Maj Terry A. Wilkins Maj Douglas Railey April 1995
Disclaimer Statement The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense, or the Government of Saudi Arabia.Acknowledgments The members of the Gulf War Logistics research team wish to thank our faculty research advisors, Major Brad Lafferty and Major Rick Huhn, for their invaluable assistance. We also gratefully acknowledge the expertise and cooperation of the staffs at the Air University Library, the Air Force Historical Research Center, the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth and the US ArmyCombined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee. Finally, and most importantly, we want to thank the man whose foresight and sense of history made this research possible: Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, USA (ret). Throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm, LTG Pagonis went to great lengths to ensure that logisticians kept written records and photographic documentation of their day to dayoperations. He generously made those items available to us. He also traveled to Air Command and Staff College on two occasions to meet with our team and to answer our questions. This paper and the accompanying toolbook simply would not have been possible without LTG Pagonis’s support.
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Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS....................................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... iv BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY .................................................................................1 Statement of Purpose and Thesis ..................................................................................1 Statementof the Problem..............................................................................................2 Literature Review.........................................................................................................2 Methodology ................................................................................................................4 ARMY LOGISTICS DOCTRINE: FROM VIETNAM TOAIRLAND BATTLE ................................5 The Theory Behind the Doctrine...................................................................................5 Logistics Theory Into Practice--The Vietnam War ........................................................5 Post-Vietnam--Rethinking the Doctrine ........................................................................6 Roots of GulfWar Logistics Doctrine: AirLand Battle Doctrine ...................................7 LOGISTICS IN THE GULF WAR...........................................................................................9 The Theater and the Plan ..............................................................................................9 TheChallenge............................................................................................................. 10 A Single Logistics Leader: The First Doctrinal Deviation............................................ 11 Ramifications of Schwarzkopf’s Decision ................................................................... 12 The First Hurdle: Reception of Forces ........................................................................ 13 The Second Hurdle:...
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