Principios De La Guerra

Principios de la Guerra

Gran Bretaña | Chile |
The Selection and Maintenance of the AimThe initial aim was stated as “Prepare to land with a view to repossessing the Falklands” about one week after the Argentineans invaded. It was changed to “Repossess the Falklands” on May 12th.While the first aim could, at least in theory, have been met without getting up from one’s armchair, it was 42days before a simple, clear aimwas given. Events up to that time reflected the excessive vagueness of the first aim and the consequences of that vagueness. Events subsequent to 12th May reflected the importance of having a clearly stated aim as early as possible. However, it was not easy, mainly on political grounds, to be more definite much earlier. The military plan, only developed anddisseminated on April 17th, had repossession very much in mind and, for a range of reasons, assumed an end date to the campaign of June 14th. As far as ‘maintenance of the aim’ isconcerned, the campaign would appear to have been a classic example since it was achieved on the precise date forecast! | Mantención del Objeto: Las operaciones deben se dirigidas en forma clara e inequívoca hacia el efectodeseado sobre el Objetivo determinado, sin abandonarlo. |
Maintenance of Morale Quite a problem, aggravated by ‘war’ never being declared or over.However, morale was maintained by all the usual means without making any special efforts. My own general theme was ‘Don’t concern yourselves too much about why we are going down, or even whether we will get away with it if it does come to war, just do thevery best you each can, if nothing else that is your best chance of survival’. | Mantención de la Moral: Basada en la autoestima e inspirada en un propósito común |
Offensive Action The very nature of the operation had perforce to be offensive. The difficulty was to know what offensive, or defensive, activities would be successful in a largely untried-in-war force essentially trained for acompletely different kind of war. Consequently, the early stages after entering the Exclusion Zone were frequently experimental in nature on the basis that depending on results, we would reinforce success and retire from failure. Wherever possible, the initiative was retained while we tried to find out what worked best. | Ofensiva: Actitud permanente que da dinamismo a las operaciones para lograr elObjeto y facilita alcanzar los otros principios. Puede coexistir con Objetivos Políticos conservadores. |
SecurityThe main problem was the media, who with cameras on the spot were initially slow to understand the requirements. This was also a major problem in press releases at home. The pastoral need to advertise the sinking of a warship was seldom/never weighed against the free damage assessmenthanded to the enemy. For instance, the Argentineans had no way of knowing whether their first Exocet attack had worked until the information about HMS SHEFFIELD was released in London. As for Force Protection, it is clear that we had enough, just.The sinking of the BELGRANO, while it did in fact, defeat the Argentinean Navy, could never be assumed to have done so, even after June 14th. It is onlyin the light of subsequent events that the effect of BELGRANO became apparent. I personally do not feel that I ever felt I had adequate security from start to my own finish on about July 3rd. I was always very conscious that the agentineans could come again with just four A4s and ruin our day if we got careless and they got lucky.HERMES, then INVINCIBLE stayed well out at sea at nearly all timesincluding the months after the land battle finished. It should be remembered that not only was no war declared at the beginning, no peace was ever declared after the main fighting was over. That said, lack of security must not allow you to be ‘frozen’ in your plans and operations. | Seguridad: Revela prevención, conservación y anticipación. Medidas de seguridad activas y pasivas para negar...