seguridad sox

Ley Sarbanes-Oxley

Esperanza RIVEROS, Juan GARCIA, Edwin RODRIGUEZ


ABSTRACT -- The aim of the paper is to show that, for banking institutions, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) regulation is redundant,and imposes additional unnecessary compliance costs. The banking industry in the United States is heavily regulated. Each of the regulations that banks must follow was developed in isolation byvarious governing bodies, causing many regulatory provisions to be redundant, overlapping or contradictory. In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the Securitiesand Exchange Commission's answer to restoring investor confidence. However, the enactment of SOX was done hastily, and its effects on industries like the banking sector were largely ignored. SOXoverlaps with previously enacted banking regulations such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AML) and Basel II, amongothers. The redundant nature of SOX is costing banking institutions large sums of time and money. It is essential that banks strive to achieve a single compliance framework that can manage all of theregulations to which the bank is subject in order to mitigate the costs of redundancy.( El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que, para las instituciones bancarias, la ley Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) laregulación es redundante, e impone costos de cumplimiento innecesarios adicionales. La industria bancaria en los Estados Unidos está fuertemente regulada. Cada una de las normas que deben seguir los bancosse desarrolló en el aislamiento por diversos órganos de gobierno, causando muchas de las disposiciones reglamentarias que sean redundantes, se solapan o contradictoria. A raíz de los escándalos de comolos de Enron, Tyco International, WorldComy Peregrine Systems, la Ley Sarbanes-Oxley de 2002 fue la respuesta de la Comisión de Bolsa y Valores para restaurar la confianza de los inversores. Sin...