Coherence And Conditionality In European Foreign Policy

The global trend toward economic integration reached new heights in October 2000 when a multifaceted trade and political agreement between Mexico and the European Union (EU) entered into effect. In the making since May 1995, the “Economic Partnership, Political Coordination, and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Mexico” (hereafter, “Global Agreement”) replaced the far lesscomprehensive “Cooperation Framework Agreement” between the two parties of April 1991. The new Global Agreement represents the first transatlantic free-trade accord agreed by the EU; it also is one of the most ambitious pacts ever negotiated by the EU with a state that has absolutely no possibility of joining the EU. In addition, the Agreement is the first treaty Mexico has ever accepted thatexplicitly conditions the relationship on the respect of democratic principles and human rights. Finally, the Global Agreement links the two largest markets in the world: that of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU, and it may have major repercussions for future regional trade agreements, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
The distinctive features of thisagreement, its broader implications, and its successful conclusion despite obstacles on both sides of the Atlantic present a number of puzzles for students of political economy and regional integration. Above all, why did the EU insist so strongly on linking a trade-centered pact to political conditions, even to the extent of threatening to derail the agreement? Why did Mexico agree to suchconditions in the end after initially refusing them so adamantly? And what is the broader significance of this agreement, not only for the future of EU-Mexican relations but also for the development of the EU as a global actor? As the economic case for this agreement is only moderately compelling on both sides, and because the EU was unable to offer membership to Mexico to encourage its compliance, wealso must consider normative and political factors. In particular, we show how the Global Agreement upholds two fundamental political principles in EU foreign policy and trade strategy. We also explain why Mexico agreed to these principles despite serious reservations over doing so and despite the EU’s inability to use membership as an incentive, a major source of its power toward the states ofCentral and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2003). By answering these questions, we also hope to shed light on how the EU defines its foreign policy interests, particularly the constraints and opportunities faced by that organization as it attempts to shape its global political identity.
We argue that the EU's ability to make the trade agreement with Mexico contingent on politicalfactors may represent an important, though under-explored, source of external political power for the EU. Obviously, the EU could not offer the reward of EU membership to Mexico to induce it to accept the agreement, unlike EU relations with other European countries. Equally importantly, Mexico, like most states, exhibits a general propensity to avoid outside influence in its domestic affairs(Hey & Kuzma, 1993). For example, NAFTA has no significant provisions for regular contacts between government officials; this gap tends to reduce bilateral talks to accusations on drugs and immigration policy during America's regular “certification” procedures for its relationships with weaker countries like Mexico. NAFTA also lacks any noteworthy references to civil society, democracy, and humanrights; it is essentially a business contract. Conversely, the EU-Mexico Global Agreement builds upon more than two decades of EU engagement with Latin America, where the EU first had to assert its position toward a number of dictators and, starting with Chile, chose to support the democratic opposition. Unlike NAFTA, the Global Agreement is specifically predicated on the satisfaction of...