Estudio De La Concentración De Riqueza Mundial Por Parte De Un Número Reducido De Empresas Realizado Por Los Científicos Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder Y Stefano Battistones De La Universidad De Zurich
Páginas: 50 (12459 palabras)
Publicado: 24 de noviembre de 2012
S. Vitali, J.B. Glattfelder, and S. Battiston:
The network of global corporate control
The network of global corporate control
Stefania Vitali1 , James B. Glattfelder1 , and Stefano Battiston1
arXiv:1107.5728v2 [q-fin.GN] 19 Sep 2011
1
Chair of Systems Design, ETH Zurich, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland,
corresponding author, email: sbattiston@ethz.ch
Abstract
Thestructure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was
no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the
architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control
held by each global player.We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions.
This core can be seen as an economic “super-entity” that raises new important issues both for
researchers and policy makers.
Introduction
A common intuition among scholars and in the media sees the global economy as beingdominated by a handful of powerful transnational corporations (TNCs). However, this has not been
confirmed or rejected with explicit numbers. A quantitative investigation is not a trivial task
because firms may exert control over other firms via a web of direct and indirect ownership relations which extends over many countries. Therefore, a complex network analysis [1] is needed in
order to uncover thestructure of control and its implications. Recently, economic networks have
attracted growing attention [2], e.g., networks of trade [3], products [4], credit [5, 6], stock prices
[7] and boards of directors [8, 9]. This literature has also analyzed ownership networks [10, 11],
but has neglected the structure of control at a global level. Even the corporate governance literature has only studiedsmall national business groups [12]. Certainly, it is intuitive that every large
corporation has a pyramid of subsidiaries below and a number of shareholders above. However,
economic theory does not offer models that predict how TNCs globally connect to each other.
Three alternative hypotheses can be formulated. TNCs may remain isolated, cluster in separated
coalitions, or form a giantconnected component, possibly with a core-periphery structure. So
far, this issue has remained unaddressed, notwithstanding its important implications for policy
making. Indeed, mutual ownership relations among firms within the same sector can, in some
cases, jeopardize market competition [13, 14]. Moreover, linkages among financial institutions
have been recognized to have ambiguous effects on theirfinancial fragility [15, 16]. Verifying to
1/36
S. Vitali, J.B. Glattfelder, and S. Battiston:
The network of global corporate control
A
B
C
D
Figure 1: Ownership and Control. (A&B) Direct and indirect ownership. (A) Firm i has Wij
percent of direct ownership in firm j . Through j , it has also an indirect ownership in k and l. (B)
With cycles one has to take into account therecursive paths, see SI Appendix, Sec. 3.1. (C&D)
Threshold model. (C) Percentages of ownership are indicated along the links. (D) If a shareholder
has ownership exceeding a threshold (e.g. 50%), it has full control (100%) and the others have
none (0%). More conservative model of control are also considered see SI Appendix, Sec. 3.1.
what extent these implications hold true in the globaleconomy is per se an unexplored field of
research and is beyond the scope of this article. However, a necessary precondition to such investigations is to uncover the worldwide structure of corporate control. This was never performed
before and it is the aim of the present work.
Methods
Ownership refers to a person or a firm owning another firm entirely or partially. Let W denote
the ownership...
The network of global corporate control
The network of global corporate control
Stefania Vitali1 , James B. Glattfelder1 , and Stefano Battiston1
arXiv:1107.5728v2 [q-fin.GN] 19 Sep 2011
1
Chair of Systems Design, ETH Zurich, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland,
corresponding author, email: sbattiston@ethz.ch
Abstract
Thestructure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was
no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the
architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control
held by each global player.We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions.
This core can be seen as an economic “super-entity” that raises new important issues both for
researchers and policy makers.
Introduction
A common intuition among scholars and in the media sees the global economy as beingdominated by a handful of powerful transnational corporations (TNCs). However, this has not been
confirmed or rejected with explicit numbers. A quantitative investigation is not a trivial task
because firms may exert control over other firms via a web of direct and indirect ownership relations which extends over many countries. Therefore, a complex network analysis [1] is needed in
order to uncover thestructure of control and its implications. Recently, economic networks have
attracted growing attention [2], e.g., networks of trade [3], products [4], credit [5, 6], stock prices
[7] and boards of directors [8, 9]. This literature has also analyzed ownership networks [10, 11],
but has neglected the structure of control at a global level. Even the corporate governance literature has only studiedsmall national business groups [12]. Certainly, it is intuitive that every large
corporation has a pyramid of subsidiaries below and a number of shareholders above. However,
economic theory does not offer models that predict how TNCs globally connect to each other.
Three alternative hypotheses can be formulated. TNCs may remain isolated, cluster in separated
coalitions, or form a giantconnected component, possibly with a core-periphery structure. So
far, this issue has remained unaddressed, notwithstanding its important implications for policy
making. Indeed, mutual ownership relations among firms within the same sector can, in some
cases, jeopardize market competition [13, 14]. Moreover, linkages among financial institutions
have been recognized to have ambiguous effects on theirfinancial fragility [15, 16]. Verifying to
1/36
S. Vitali, J.B. Glattfelder, and S. Battiston:
The network of global corporate control
A
B
C
D
Figure 1: Ownership and Control. (A&B) Direct and indirect ownership. (A) Firm i has Wij
percent of direct ownership in firm j . Through j , it has also an indirect ownership in k and l. (B)
With cycles one has to take into account therecursive paths, see SI Appendix, Sec. 3.1. (C&D)
Threshold model. (C) Percentages of ownership are indicated along the links. (D) If a shareholder
has ownership exceeding a threshold (e.g. 50%), it has full control (100%) and the others have
none (0%). More conservative model of control are also considered see SI Appendix, Sec. 3.1.
what extent these implications hold true in the globaleconomy is per se an unexplored field of
research and is beyond the scope of this article. However, a necessary precondition to such investigations is to uncover the worldwide structure of corporate control. This was never performed
before and it is the aim of the present work.
Methods
Ownership refers to a person or a firm owning another firm entirely or partially. Let W denote
the ownership...
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