Jeffrey M. Stambovsky, Appellant, V. Helen V. Ackley
Jeffrey M. Stambovsky, Appellant,
v.
Helen V. Ackley et al., Respondents
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Department.
July 18, 1991
William M. Stein of counsel (Hood & Stein, attorneys), for appellant.
Andrew C. Bisulca of counsel (Mann, Mann & Lewis, P. C., attorneys), for Helen V. Ackley, respondent.
Jeffrey J.Ellis of counsel (Quirk & Bakalor, P. C., attorneys), for Ellis Realty, respondent.
ROSS and KASSAL, JJ., concur with RUBIN, J.; MILONAS, J. P., and SMITH, J., dissent in an opinion by SMITH, J.
255*255RUBIN, J.
Plaintiff, to his horror, discovered that the house he had recently contracted to purchase was widely reputed to be 256*256 possessed by poltergeists, reportedly seen by defendant sellerand members of her family on numerous occasions over the last nine years. Plaintiff promptly commenced this action seeking rescission of the contract of sale. Supreme Court reluctantly dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiff has no remedy at law in this jurisdiction.
The unusual facts of this case, as disclosed by the record, clearly warrant a grant of equitable relief to the buyer who, asa resident of New York City, cannot be expected to have any familiarity with the folklore of the Village of Nyack. Not being a "local", plaintiff could not readily learn that the home he had contracted to purchase is haunted. Whether the source of the spectral apparitions seen by defendant seller are parapsychic or psychogenic, having reported their presence in both a national publication(Readers' Digest) and the local press (in 1977 and 1982, respectively), defendant is estopped to deny their existence and, as a matter of law, the house is haunted. More to the point, however, no divination is required to conclude that it is defendant's promotional efforts in publicizing her close encounters with these spirits which fostered the home's reputation in the community. In 1989, the house wasincluded in five-home walking tour of Nyack and described in a November 27th newspaper article as "a riverfront Victorian (with ghost)." The impact of the reputation thus created goes to the very essence of the bargain between the parties, greatly impairing both the value of the property and its potential for resale. The extent of this impairment may be presumed for the purpose of reviewing thedisposition of this motion to dismiss the cause of action for rescission (Harris v City of New York, 147 AD2d 186, 188-189) and represents merely an issue of fact for resolution at trial.
While I agree with Supreme Court that the real estate broker, as agent for the seller, is under no duty to disclose to a potential buyer the phantasmal reputation of the premises and that, in his pursuit of a legalremedy for fraudulent misrepresentation against the seller, plaintiff hasn't a ghost of a chance, I am nevertheless moved by the spirit of equity to allow the buyer to seek rescission of the contract of sale and recovery of his down payment. New York law fails to recognize any remedy for damages incurred as a result of the seller's mere silence, applying instead the strict rule of caveat emptor.Therefore, the theoretical basis for granting relief, even under the extraordinary facts of this case, is elusive if not ephemeral.
257*257"Pity me not but lend thy serious hearing to what I shall unfold" (William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene V [Ghost]).
From the perspective of a person in the position of plaintiff herein, a very practical problem arises with respect to the discovery of aparanormal phenomenon: "Who you gonna' call?" as a title song to the movie "Ghostbusters" asks. Applying the strict rule of caveat emptor to a contract involving a house possessed by poltergeists conjures up visions of a psychic or medium routinely accompanying the structural engineer and Terminix man on an inspection of every home subject to a contract of sale. It portends that the prudent...
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