Elaboracion de politicas

To Marlene

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reprodiiced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pliotocopy, recording, or nny information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from tlie publislier. Copyright Q 1997 by Westview Press, A Member of Perseus Books GroupPul>lisliedin 1997 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue. Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877,and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hidf Copse Road, Cumnor Hill. Oxford 0x2 9JJ

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 0-8133-6879-0 (hc) ISBN 0-8133-9968-8 (pb) Tlie paper used in this publication meets the requirementsof the Arnerican Nationlil Standard for Permanence of h p e r for Printed Library Materials 239.48- 1984.

O N BEMAND

1

0

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

Contents
List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments

Introduction
1

Policy Research in the Face of Complexity Actor-Centered Institutionalisrn Actors Actor Constellations Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and MinirnalInstitutions Negotiated Agreements Decisions by Majority Vote Hierarchical Direction Varieties of the Negotiating State

2
3

4 5
6
7
8

9

Appendix 1: A Game-Tlzeoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe ~ b ~ e n d2: x i Eflcient Self-Coordination in Policy NetworksA Simulation Study, with Matthias Mohr

Referentes
About the Book and Autlzor IndexTables and Figures
Tables 2.1 Modes of interaction
3.1 Overview: Aggregate, collective, and corporate actors 7.1 The voting paradox

Al.1 Changes in gross domestic product, employment, and consumer prices, average rates of unemployment A1.2 Consumer price inflation and annual increases of unit labor costs in manufacturing, 1974-1980 A2.1 Random payoffs, 4 ylayers, 2 options A2.2 Nash equilibriain sequential games A2.3 Average normalized joint-payoff gains through negative coordination A2.4 Average normalized joint-payoff gains through bargaining

Figures 1.1 "Monetarist" game in normal and extensive form 1.2 "Keynesian" game in normal and extensive form
1.1 Forward-looking hypotheses 1.2 Backward-looking hypotheses 2.1 The domain of interaction-oriented policy research 3.1 Types ofcollective actors Constellations of pure coordination and pure conflict Four mixed-motive games Deadlock and Rambo games Social regulations in the European Union European harmonization of welfare-state rules Five interaction orientations Individualistic, competitive, and solidaristic transformations of two game consteilations The Kaldor welfare criterion

xii

Tables and Figura

Tables andFigures

5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.1 1 6.12 6.13 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 9.1

Nash equilibria (N) in four mixed-motive games Games without a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies Negative coordination Two implementation garnes Matrix and negotiation diagram of Prisoner's Dilemma Negotiation space Conflict over distribution Referente points of distributive justice: Zero,status quo, o r nonagreement Effects of misrepresentation Four types of negotiation processes Side payments in a compulsory negotiation system Bargaining to avoid welfare losses Issue linkage Dependence of production on distribution Forms of dependence in a relationship between A and B Battle of the Sexes under conditions of mutual íind unilateral dependence
I

Problem Solving PositiveCoordination Welfare effects of dictatorial coalitions Joint payoffs from Positive Coordination Positive Coordination plus Parametric Adjustment Positive plus Negative Coordination Positive plus Negative Coordination plus Bargaining Comparison of welfare effects when the status quo is at the joint-payoff minimum A2.11 Welfare effects with random status quo A2.12 Search costs and welfare effects
A2.3 A2.4...