Macro

La intervención de una tercera parte tiene como propósito ayudar a las partes en conflicto a que éste no sea destructivo. (Zalles, 193)
Cuando surge un nuevo conflicto, la tercera parte ayuda a evitar el escalamiento.
The RPF and the Rwandan government signed a cease-fire at Arusha, Tanzania in July 1992 and in August 1992 they signed the first of a series of agreements that would be known asthe Arusha Accords. (Desforges, 48).
By the time serious talks with the RPF began in 1992, the Rwandan army had grown to some 30,000 soldiers. An important number of them opposed the negotiations, not just because they did not want to give up the fight, but also because they dreaded demobilization. The thousands of troops who had been recruited since the start of the war had become accustomed tothe advantages of the military life. The MRND and the CDR fed their fears by spreading rumors that soldiers would be thrown out onto a disintegrating economy without hope of finding work (49).
Responding to pressure from the military as well as from civilian hard-liners, Habyarimana disavowed the Arusha Accords in a speech in Ruhengeri on November15. Making clear that he did not intend toimplement the agreement that he had signed three months before, Habyarimana called the Accords “a scrap of paper” (49)

Habyarimana had also talked about elections that would someday be held in Rwanda, promising that the MRND militia, the Interahamwe, would serve as a striking force to ensure his victory (68).

The setting was an MRND meeting at Kabaya, not far from Habyarimana’s home, in thenorthwestern prefecture of Gisenyi. The speaker, Mugesera, was then vice-president of the MRND for the prefecture as well as an official of the Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Feminine Affairs (68)

The next was the first protocol of the Arusha Accords, which Habyarimana signed under heavy domestic and international pressure in August 1992 (70).
The last was the January 1993 signature ofa further protocol of the Accords concerning the transitional government that was to govern in the interim between the signature of the peace treaty and elections (70)

But progress to peace was one step forward and two steps back.

During these weeks, the president was apparently conducting private negotiations with the RPF through a Jesuit priest, seeking to obtain assurance of a amnestyfor himself in return for his resignation (80).

At the end of October, nonetheless, the Rwandan government and the RPF signed the second part of the Arusha Accords (TWO WEEKS LATER DISAVOIDED) (80).

Particularly valuable are the discussion of the 14-month negotiation process that produced the unsuccessful 1993 Arusha accords and the analysis of why the abortive peace process failed to resolvethe problem of extremist spoilers within the Hutu-dominated Rwandan regime

The vital factor distinguishing success from failure has usually not been so much the UN institutions, but rather the policies of the major powers on the Security Council and the intractability of the conflicts themselves. Where parties have consented to a UN mandate and have wished to settle, and where adequatefinances and personnel have been available, mandates have been clear and chains of command and communication have been straightforward, the UN has been able to play a remarkable and useful role; but when the parties have been unwilling to accept a UN role, the UN has not been able to impose settlements.

But, in addition to greater capacity to update information and link humanitarian and conflictresolution agencies, as shown in the UN’s Department of Humanitarian Affairs' ReliefWeb (DHA, 1997), there are also possibilities for overcoming the baleful effects of media manipulation such as that perpetrated on behalf of genocidal political programmes by Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines in Rwanda and state-controlled media in Serbia (Miall).
Rwanda in 1994, the worst massacres have...